Hello and welcome to the Monday, August 4th, 2025
edition of the SANS Internet Storm Center's Stormcast. My
name is Johannes Ullrich, recording today from
Jacksonville, Florida. And this episode is brought to you
by the SANS.edu Graduate Certificate Program in
Incident Response. Nothing groundbreaking today as far as
Internet Storm Center data goes. Well, the one little bit
odd thing we had is scans for SSH and Telnet using the
username POP3 user and the password. Well, just the
username or 123456. Just a reminder that, well, yes,
those old protocols may still be out there. So if you no
longer use POP, make sure you don't just disable the POP3
server, but also, well, remove associated accounts if
possible or make sure they're at least not able to log in.
Because, well, given that they are probably 10 or so years
old, who knows what the password is. And it may be
something stupidly simple. Also interesting here, the
network where these particular scans originated from, well,
it's managed by Unmanaged according to WHOIS. That
appears to be the official name of that particular
network service provider. So Unmanaged.uk. It's a UK
provider, at least according to the records. Don't think
they're doing much in terms of managing abuse and the like.
These are often also some bulletproof hosting providers.
Haven't seen this particular one before, but often I don't
really bother looking at the WHOIS record. So definitely,
well, like I said, maybe just block that particular network.
Haven't really seen anything too useful in that network.
And ArcticWolf published a blog post stating that they
suspect there may be a serode vulnerability that hasn't
really been fully described yet that is being used by
ransomware actor Akira to breach SonicWall SL VPN
networks. They say they haven't really found any sort
of definite evidence that this is a serode, but affected
devices were fully patched. They had their credentials
rotated and multi-factor authentication enabled. Now,
to put this a little bit in context, we also had some
reports recently that the SonicWall instances that were
fully patched were breached based on credentials that got
leaked in prior breaches using older vulnerabilities before
this particular device was patched. This may include
multi-factor authentication because the seat for the one
-time password that's being used here for multi-factor
authentication could also be stolen using these prior
vulnerabilities. So, really not clear what's going on
here. ArcticWolf does suggest that you disable the SonicWall
SSL VPN that appears to be sort of the critical component here
that this SSL VPN has to be enabled in order for these
devices to be exploited. So, lots of unknowns here. That's
always a little bit unsettling, but I would
definitely recommend that you at least take a very close
look at these devices. And if possible, disable SSL VPN until
we hear more from SonicWall directly. And researchers from
Nextron Systems discovered an interesting new PAM-based
backdoor for Linux that they're calling Blake. Now,
PAM is interesting for Linux insofar because pluggable
authentication modules. It's essentially what controls
access to the system. So, if you're connecting via SH or
other tools, the server then often checks with PAM whether
or not you have access to the system and, well, how you have
access to the system. So, an attacker able to inject their
own code into your PAM setup is able to essentially bypass
authentication. That's pretty much what this backdoor does.
Ultimately, this idea isn't new. There has plenty been
written about these PAM-based backdoors. This one apparently
has been around for quite a while, like a year or so, and
hasn't really been described yet. And antivirus is still
not really detecting it. Overall, you really must
monitor your authentication system, your PAM configuration
alike. Make sure nothing has been altered here. There are
some indicators of compromise that are noted in the blog,
but it ultimately comes down to locking down and monitoring
your authentication configuration. Well, and
that's it for today. So, thanks again for listening.
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Thanks and talk to you again tomorrow. Bye.